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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORP., 
A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
JOAN PATTON 
Defendant/Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF 
DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. Basis For Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals 
This Appeal is from the conviction of Appellant in the Fourth District Court, Provo 
Department, Judge Gary D. Stott presiding in a bench trial. 
B. Basis For Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals 
Final judgments of conviction appealable to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1953 as amended). 
C. Appealability of Judgement 
A judgment of conviction in a District Court is a final Order pursuant to U.C.A. 78-3-4 
(1953 as amended). 
D. Notice of Appeal 
The Appellant was convicted on May 19, 1997 of violation of Provo City Ordinance 
14.34.080(1) Abandonded/Wrecked/Junked Vehicle, and sentenced on June 23, 1997. 
Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Arrest of Judgment which were 
denied on August 4, 1997. A Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court July 23, 
1997 and September 3, 1997. On September 26, 1997 this Court issued a Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition that motion was dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues raised on this appeal are all questions of law, and the Court of Appeals therefore 
has full power of review, without deference to the findings of the Trial Court. State v. Pena 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), at 936 and State v. Jacques 924 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1996), at 900. 
1. Was the defendant substantially prejudiced by prosecution's failure to inform her of witness 
Roger Gonzales. 
2. Did the Tri Did the trial court err in overruling defendant's objection to introduction of the 
surprise testimony of Roger Gonzales, and in denying defendant's motion for new trial and 
motion for arrest of judgment so prejudice defendant's case as to undermine confidence in 
its validity and warrant reversal. 
3. Did the Defendant have a right to rely on the standards of enforcement set by a Court of 
Competent Jurisdiction during prior cases. 
4. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to allow evidence of a Court established standard. 
5. The ordinance should be struck down as vague as it lacks standards necessary to prevent 
arbitrary enforcement. 
6. The ordinance violates the defendants Constitutional rights in its application by failure to 
provide Equal Protection and Uniform Application. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
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for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, 
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just 
under the circumstances. 
2. Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
3. Provo City Ordinance Section 14.34.080(3): 
No trash, used materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, scrap material, 
equipment or parts thereof shall be stored in an open area 
4. Utah Constitution Article I Sec. 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
5. United States Constitution Amendment XIV Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Joan Patton and co-defendant, William Patton, were served with summons on May 31, 
1996, channn<* that on March 19, 1996, both defendants had abandoned, wrecked or 
junked vehicles, or miscellaneous materials in their yard, in violation of Provo City 
Ordinance 14 34 080 (Trial Index, pages 2-4) 
B Extensive informal discovery was conducted by the defendants, beginning at arraignment 
and continuing throughout preparation for trial The Trial Court asked Provo City if there 
was any problem with providing complete discovery City Attorney told both Ms Patton 
and the Trial Court that the city would provide Ms Patton with all information in the file 
C At pretrial, the city attorney assured the Court and the Defendant that all matters in the 
city's file would be provided to the Defendants At that time, the city's zoning officer, 
Anthony Malloy, indicated to the Defendants and counsel that (1) The complainant in this 
case was the city as Mr Malloy had been given a "Open" file on the defendants and that he 
had decided to open a new file for 1996 (2) That he would be the only witness for the 
city, and that he had taken all relevant photos Ms Patton raised the issue of vagueness of 
ordinance relating to fence in that the ordinance states that a front fence can be nor more 
than 3 feet but fails to specify whether the 3 feet is a height, width or depth dimension 
D Ms Patton prepared her defense based upon her thorough inspection of the representation 
by the city attorney that she was being given access the entire city attorney's file Further, 
defense was based on the statements made by both the city attorney and Mr Malloy In 
none of the materials received by Defendants prior to trial and in no conversations with 
either the city's attorneys nor Mr Malloy was the Defendant ever informed that the City 
intended to call a Roger Gonzales as a witness 
E At trial on May 19, 1997, Mr Malloy stated that Roger Gonzales had taken the relevant 
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photos that the city submitted as evidence, contrary to the representations he had 
previously made at pretrial to the Defendant. Mr. Malloy further stated the lack of any 
standard definition for any term in any of the zoning ordinances in this case. What is 
perceived as junk to one zoning officer might not be perceived as junk to another zoning 
officer. The city then proceeded to call Roger Gonzales as a witness after indicating to the 
Appellant that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. Ms. Patton objected to the 
admission of Mr. Gonzales1 testimony inasmuch as they were entirely unprepared to cross-
examine him on any matter, having relied on the City's representations regarding the 
contents of the City's file and the source of the photos. Ms Patton's objection was 
overruled because she had not filed an explicit written request for a list of witnesses. This 
despite the fact that the court had ordered the city to provide and the city had agreed to 
provide total discovery. Mr. Gonzales was the sole witness to testify that there was trash 
in the Appellant's yard on March 19, 1996. In ruling against the Defendant, the Court 
found insufficient evidence as to any matter testified to by Mr. Malloy, but specifically 
found that there was trash in the yard on March 19, 1996. 
At sentencing on June 23, 1997, Ms. Patton presented a Motion for Arrest of Judgment 
and a Motion for New Trial, based on the Court's error in admitting the testimony of Mr. 
Gonzales. This motion was later denied. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Extensive discovery was conducted prior to trial by the Defendants. Beginning at 
arraignment and continuing throughout preparation for trial the Plaintiffs were under Court 
Order to provide discovery. In Arraignment Hearing December 4, 1996 at 4: 
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B At Pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, assured the Court and Defendant's counsel 
that all matters in the city's file would be provided to the defendants At that time the 
city's main witness, Anthony Malloy, in the presence of Mr McGinn, told the defendants 
and counsel that he would be the only witness for the city, and that he had taken all 
relevant photos Malloy had also made written statements to Mr McGinn, prior to the 
filing of the complaint stating that he, Malloy, had taken all relevant photos (Transcript of 
Sentencing Hearing, page 3) At Pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, assured the 
Court and Defendant's counsel that all matters in the city's file would be provided to the 
defendants At that time the city's main witness, Anthony Malloy, in the presence of Mr 
McGinn, told the defendants and counsel that he would be the only witness for the city, and 
that he had taken all relevant photos Malloy had also made written statements to Mr 
McGinn, prior to the filing of the complaint stating that he, Malloy, had taken all relevant 
photos (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, page 3) This document was provided to 
defendants in the course of discovery Defendant prepared his defense based upon a 
thorough inspection of the city attorney's file, and on the statements made by both the city 
attorney and Mr Malloy In none of the materials received by Defendants prior to trial and 
in no conversations with either the city's attorneys nor Mr Malloy was the Appellant ever 
informed that the City intended to call a Roger Gonzales as a witness (Trial Transcript, 
pages 64-65) 
At trial on May 19, 1997, contrary to his prior written and verbal statements, Mr Malloy 
stated that Roger Gonzales had taken the relevant photos that the city submitted as evidence 
(Trial Transcript, page 14) The city then proceeded to call Roger Gonzales as a witness 
Ms Patton objected to the admission of Mr Gonzales' testimony inasmuch as they were 
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entirely unprepared to cross-examine him on any matter, having relied on the City's 
representations regarding the contents of the City's file and the source of the photos. 
Defendant's objection was overruled upon the court's finding that Appellant had not filed 
an explicit written request for a list of witnesses. (Trial Transcript, pages 64-66). Mr. 
Gonzales was the sole witness able to testify as to any specific items in the Appellant's yard 
that might have constituted garbage on March 19, 1996. (Trial Transcript, pages 68-74). 
In ruling against the Appellant, the Court found insufficient evidence as to any matter 
testified to by Mr. Malloy and also as to any matter alleged to be shown in the photos, but 
specifically found that there was garbage in the yard on March 19, 1996. (Trial Transcript, 
pages 114-116, 120-121). 
At sentencing on June 23, 1997, Appellant presented a Motion for Arrest of Judgment and 
a Motion for New Trial, based on the Court's error in admitting the testimony of Mr. 
Gonzales. Both Motions were ultimately denied on August 4, 1997. (Trial Index, page 
42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. When discovery is voluntary, the prosecution has an affirmative duty to provide the 
defense with any inculpatory evidence prior to trial, including any witnesses the prosecution 
intends to call. Under these circumstances, the defense does not have to make a formal, specific 
request. The prosecution also has a duty not to mislead the defense. In this case, Provo City failed 
to provide the Defendant, William Patton, with a list of witnesses and made several written and 
verbal representations that misled the defense into believing that Anthony Malloy would be the 
city's sole witness. This constituted error on the city's part, compounded when the court 
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erroneously ruled that the city had no duty to provide the defense with a witness list. 
II. Defendant timely objected to allowing the surprise witness, Roger Gonzales, to testify 
at trial, and repeated those objections in post-trial motions. Inasmuch as the prosecution had erred 
in failing to notify the defense of its intent to call Mr. Gonzales, the court erred under Rule 16(g) 
and Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in failing to exclude Mr. Gonzales testimony and 
failing to grant Defendant's post-trial motions. 
III. The court's error in admitting Mr. Gonzales' surprise testimony completely prejudiced 
Defendant's case. Defendant was unable to prepare to meet the testimony. The evidence is ample 
that the defendants thoroughly prepared for such evidence as they were apprized of in discovery. 
The entire conviction was based solely on the testimony of the surprise witness. The court 
therefore erred in admitting this testimony, and further erred in refusing to grant a new trial or 
arrest of judgment. The error was thus sufficient to undermine confidence in the validity of the 
proceeding and provides ample cause for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DID THE PROSECUTION HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT 
WITH A LIST OF ALL WITNESSES PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
Discovery in a criminal case is governed by Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which states in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
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for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense, (emphasis added) 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, 
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
In a case such as Defendant's, where the specific evidence requested does not fit any of the 
detailed descriptions in subsections (a)( 1) through (a)(4), which mandate disclosure upon request, 
subsection (a)(5), the catch all provision, applies. While the wording of subsection (a)(5) might 
suggest that it requires disclosure of the material sought only to the extent ordered by the court, 
the law is clearly established that when the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a request 
under subsection (a)(5) without requiring the defense to obtain a court order, the prosecution 
cannot respond in a manner that it is misleading. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). 
In fact, the aspect of "good cause . . . which the court determines11 applies only in cases where the 
prosecution explicitly refuses to provide discovery and the defense must compel discovery by order 
of the court. Salt Lake (Itv v. Reynolds. 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993). This duty to 
provide discovery is ongoing. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987); State v. Bexishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997); Rule 
16(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure. This is especially so when discovery is voluntary. State v. 
Kalliih 877 P.2d 138, 142 (Utah 1994). 
When discovery is voluntary, the prosecution has an affirmative duty not to mislead the 
defense, and specifically to provide inculpatory evidence. State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d at 532. In 
Beszishe the defense's opening statement at trial, based on pre-trial discovery, was that the 
prosecution had no tangible evidence linking the defendant to the alleged rape of a child. After the 
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trial had begun, the prosecutor attempted to discredit this statement by sending the alleged victim's 
panties to the crime lab for additional testing. The defendant's only opportunity to counter the 
evidence was through frantic efforts between trial sessions. 937 P.2d at 529. In Salt Lake (77v r. 
Reynolds, the city failed to completely respond to the defendant's discovery request, but also failed 
to inform the defense that it was refusing to provide all requested information. The defense did not 
attempt to compel discovery because the prosecution's conduct had misled them to believe they 
had no reason to do so. 849 P.2d at 585. In State v. Knizht, the prosecution offered to provide all 
discovery voluntarily under an "open file" policy. The defense specifically inquired as to certain 
witnesses and was repeatedly assured that they would not be called at trial. Nevertheless, on the 
day of trial, those witnesses were called. The defense had no opportunity to prepare and was 
misled into preparing a trial strategy different from what the situation demanded. 734 P.2d at 916. 
This is particularly parallel to the situation in the present case. At arraignment, the prosecution 
declared that it would provide all discovery materials to the defendants. (Arraignment transcript, 
page 5). At pretrial, the city attorney, Gary McGinn, reaffirmed his intention to provide the 
defense with all materials in the file (Sentencing transcript, pages 3-5), and at trial he was adamant 
that he had done so. (Trial transcript, page 64). The discovery materials provided to both 
defendants contained no witness list whatsoever. They did, however, contain a memorandum from 
the city inspector, Anthony Malloy, to Mr. McGinn stating that Malloy had taken all the relevant 
photos. Consistent with this document, and in response to the direct question at pretrial of both 
Mrs. Patton and Mr. Humiston as to who the city's witnesses would be, both Mr. Malloy and Mr. 
McGinn clearly represented that Mr. Malloy would be the only witness. (Sentencing transcript, 
pages 3-5). The defense thus had no indication that any other witnesses would be called and no 
reason to inquire any further. 
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While the defense has a duty to pursue discovery diligently (State v. Kallith 877 P.2d 138, 
143 [Utah 1994]), an inadequate response by the prosecution will logically lead the defense to infer 
that there is no further information. Salt Lake v. Reynolds; 849 P.2d at 582. 
When Roger Gonzales was presented as a witness at trial, both defendants objected 
vehemently. (Trial transcript, pages 62-66). The court ruled, however, that the city had no 
obligation to notify the defense of the city's intention to call Mr. Gonzales, as the record contained 
no specific request for witnesses. (Trial transcript, pages 65-66). As is clear from Knight and the 
numerous related cases, there was no need for a specific request for a witness list, and the 
prosecution had a positive duty not to mislead the defense. The court's ruling was thus clearly 
incorrect, and the conduct of the prosecution was improper. 
II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
i 
INTRODUCTION OF THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY OF ROGER GONZALES, AND IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT SO PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S CASE AS TO UNDERMINE 
CONFIDENCE IN ITS VALIDITY AND WARRANT REVERSAL. 
The court broad discretion in remedying abuses of discovery. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(1994). Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just 
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under the circumstances. 
However, the "effective administration of justice requires that discoverable evidence be 
provided much sooner than 'moments' before trial." State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 532. 
Rule 30(a) provides: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
When it is clear, as it is here, that the defense had exercised all reasonable diligence in 
discovery and properly preserved all objections, the two questions the court must answer are 
whether admission of the surprise testimony was error, and whether that error was prejudicial. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 916. It has already been clearly established that allowing the 
testimony was error, and the sole question remaining is whether that error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal. State v. (\xrtei\ 707 P.2d 656, 662 (1985). 
An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, the 
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at trial. Knight, 734 P.2d at 919. A 
"reasonable likelihood" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
trial. Howell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996). The 
quantum of probability required to undermine confidence falls far short of "more probable than 
not". Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. State v. Jacques. 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah App. 1996). Indeed, 
when the defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the 
defense, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to show that the error was harmless. Knight, 
734 P.2d at 921; State v. Belt, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988). 
In Defendant's case, it is clear that Gonzales' testimony was severely prejudicial. Three 
witnesses testified at trial: Anthony Malloy, Roger Gonzales, and Brent Keller. The bulk of Mr. 
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Malloy1 s testimony regarded abandoned and junked vehicles (Trial Transcript, pages 26 through 
56) As a result of discovery, the defendants had opportunity to prepare for this testimony, as is 
clear from the extensive questions asked by Mrs Patton Id. As a result, the court rejected 
virtually all of Mr Malloy1 s testimony, and specifically found that there was insufficient evidence 
on the issue of junked vehicles (Trial transcript, pages 114-115) While Mr Malloy did testify 
vaguely as to "junk11 in the yard, upon repeated cross-examination he could not specify what that 
"junk11 consisted of (Trial transcript, pages 24, 44-45, 62) Indeed, he openly stated, "I do not 
recall specifics11, Id. at 24, and "I do not recall specifically what was in the front yard area11, Id. at 
62 Mr Keller did not testify as to any items in the Patton1 s yard Id. at 87-99 Mr Gonzales, 
however, testified very specifically as to "wood and lumber scraps11 in the yard Id. at 68-74 He 
also testified, contrary to the written and verbal statements provided in discovery, that he had 
taken all the relevant photographs Id. at 67-68 
In contrast to the examination of Mr Malloy, Mrs Patton was completely unprepared to 
ask Mr Gonzales any questions, as the court specifically noted (Trial transcript, pages 70-71, Mr 
Humiston cTm going to question him on behalf of Mrs Patton, but I guess she doesn't have any 
questions prepared because we did not know about this witness11, The Court "I want the record 
to reflect that") Mr Humiston examined Mr Gonzales as best he could, being equally 
unprepared Id., pages 71-74 It is significant that in the end the court found the testimony 
regarding junked vehicles, which was the bulk of Mr Malloy1 s testimony, inconclusive Id. page 
114 It also disregarded all of the photographs Id. pages 114-115 The court found only that 
there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and this was a matter that only Mr Gonzales 
had testified to AZ, pages 115-116 The court was very specific in limiting its finding to the trash 
Id. pages 120-121 
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Had the defense had any notice whatsoever of the city's intention to call Mr Gonzales, it 
could have adequately prepared to address his testimony Unfortunately, none of the matters on 
which Mr Gonzales would have been questioned appear in the record, as the defense did not have 
that opportunity If the nature of an error prevents the court from clearly determining the effect of 
the error, the burden is upon the prosecution to show that the error was harmless State v. BelL 
770 P 2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988) Clearly, the city cannot do so in this case 
In determining whether a witness' testimony is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, a 
number of factors must be considered 
1 The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case, 
2 Whether the testimony is cumulative, 
3 The presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony, 
4 The extent of cross-examination, and 
5 The overall strength of the case 
State v. Jacques, 924 P 2d 898, 902 (Utah App 1996), State v. Hackford, 131 P 2d 200 
(1987) 
It is clear that Mr Gonzales' testimony was crucial to the city's case There was no 
specific testimony regarding trash other than his testimony, and virtually no corroborating 
evidence Cross-examination was limited by the element of surprise, and all other evidence other 
than Mr Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge 
It is thus clear that the court erred in allowing Mr Gonzales to testify, and that error 
requires reversal 
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Ill 
DEFENDANT HAVE A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE STANDARDS OF 
ENFORCEMENT SET BY A COURT OF COMPETENT 
JURISDICTION DURING PRIOR CASES. 
This appeal results from the fourth trial and conviction of the defendant, Joan Patton for a 
violation relating to the appearance and upkeep of her property. In rendering a guilty verdict the 
Circuit or District Court in each conviction established certain levels of compliance that Ms. Patton 
was required to meet and maintain with the City being given enforcement ability of those set 
standards. In the time that followed each conviction Ms. Patton has strived to continue to improve 
upon the set standard. Yet time and again Provo City has changed the standard and level of 
compliance set by the Court and charged Ms. Patton with violation of the enhanced standard. 
The party that set the standard, the Trial Court Judge, had the authority to set the standard 
of compliance. The Judge also had the authority to give the City and its agents authority to 
enforce that standard. Ms. Patton had a right to rely on the set standard. In relying on the 
standard set by the Judge Ms. Patton acted to keep her property in compliance with the standard. 
Ms. Patton was never informed that the standard of compliance could or would be changed. In 
relying on the Court set standard of compliance with this action her compliance has been to her 
damage and detriment as the City by and through its agents have changed the standard Ms. Patton 
had the come to rely upon causing her damage. When a city or person with authority to do so sets 
a standard that is relied upon to the detriment of another when the standard is changed that city or 
person is precluded from enforcing that changed standard. Provo City had a duty to inform Ms. 
Patton of changes in enforcement. A/mon, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 696 P.2d 1210 
(Utah 1985), and Sim Ray Drive-Iti Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission. 517 P.2d 289 
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(Or. 1973), and 2 Sim Ray Drive-In Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control commission, 530 P.2d 887 
(Or. 1975), and Accord Athav v. State, 626 P.2d 965 (Utah 1981). 
Provo City should be estopped from enforcing the changed standard of compliance. 
Schneider v. (IS. 119 F.2d 215 quoting R.H. Stearns Co, v. US. 241 US 54 at page 61, 
"Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. 
The label counts for little. Enough for present purposes that disability has its roots in principle 
more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to 
found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong." 
IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE 
OF A COURT ESTABLISHED STANDARD. 
The Prosecution is barred in legal theory and by evidentiary rules with few exceptions from 
bringing evidence of prior convictions in an eflfort to assert the truth of the matter then at hand, but 
when the shoe is on the other foot the Defendant is not similarly barred. The basic elements of the 
evidentiary and procedural rules are to effect fundamental fairness and an even field of play. 
Wi scorn be v. Wi scorn be, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987) Defendant case was remanded for 
further hearing upon Courts failure to hear his arguments in his defense. "Due process rests on 
concept of basic fairness," Rupp v. GrantsviUe City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). Due process 
requires opportunity to be fully heard, Worrall v. Ozden Fire Pep/., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
V 
THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS VAGUE AS IT LACKS 
STANDARDS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT. 
On its face and/or in its application Provo City Ordinance in vague to the point that it 
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impedes the necessary due process requisite in actions such as in the instant case. 'The due 
process doctrine of "void for vagueness1' has two central principles. First, criminality must be 
defined with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice concerning conduct they must avoid. 
And second, legislated crimes must not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory law 
enforcement." (V/y of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333(Wash. 1990), at 1339. In Webster the 
Washington Supreme Court was faced with a challenge of a Seattle City ordinance, SMC 
12A. 12.015(B)(1) Pedestrian interference, obstruction. "Petitioner City of Seattle contends that 
the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague inasmuch as it includes an element of specific intent. 
The requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the 
accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid.", Webster at 1339 which 
continued further, "SMC 12 A. 12.015(B)(1) provides adequate notice to persons of common 
understanding concerning the behavior prohibited and the specific intent required. It provides 
citizens, police officers and courts alike with sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 
It is not unconstitutionally vague." Emphasis added. 
Unlike Webster in the instant case the Provo City ordinance Ms. Patton has been charged 
with violating has no element of specific intent. Also lacking are basic standards of enforcement or 
definitions to guide officers in their endeavor to properly apply the ordinances 
B. THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS OVERBROAD AS IT MAKES 
CRIMINAL PROTECTED BEHAVIOR AND/OR ACTIONS. 
The Provo City ordinance should be struck down as overbroad as it prohibits innocent 
intentional acts by its failure to include a specific intent clause. In Webster the Washington 
Supreme Court found that except for the inclusion of a specific intent clause the ordinance would 
have been overbroad, "The City of Seattle argues that inclusion in the ordinance of the element of 
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specific intent saves it from being unconstitutionally overbroad We agree In Seattle v. Slack, we 
held that the element of specific intent saved another Seattle Municipal Ordinance from 
unconstitutional overbreadth " 802 P 2d 1333 (Wash 1990), at 1338 
C. THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE STRUCK DOWN AS VOID FOR 
UNREASONABLENESS 
"An ordinance which makes no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and 
conduct which is essentially innocent is an unreasonable exercise of the government's police 
power " Webster, at 1338 This ordinance unlike the Seattle ordinance makes no difference 
between intentional harm and leaving the bike your ten year old was riding which happens to be a 
bit rusty after six kids in the view of another who may judge it to be junk After all the Provo 
ordinance in the plain interpretation of its undefined word states that one or more such objects 
constitutes a junk yard Yet even though argued that a rusty bike may violate the ordinance a bike 
that was just purchased and is new with no rust of scratches ridden one time may be in violation as 
the ordinance in undefined terms states used objects 
VI 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE DEFENDANTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ITS APPLICATION BY FAILURE TO 
PROVIDE EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM APPLICATION. 
Ms Patton is a member of the extensively protected class of property owners The 
ordinance in its current application is to her detriment and violates the equal protection clauses of 
both the U S and Utah Constitutions The discrimination occurs because the ordinance is violated 
not by the Defendant's own actions, but on others own reactions to her property A person 
-18-
affluent in nature who can afford that which is new will not be found in violation whereas the 
Defendant on a lower rung of the economic ladder will have his possessions and surroundings 
declared "junk" because of age and surroundings. Supported in part by Mai in v. Lewis* 693 P.2d 
661 (Utah 1984), and State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 ( Utah App. 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
The admission of surprise testimony despite the Prosecution's failure to fulfill his duty of 
discovery is enough to mandate a New Trial upon a finding of sufficiency in the ordinance itself. 
The clear violations of due process evident in this action which stem from an ordinance that 
because of its legislative inadequacies fails to provide clear standards of enforcement, a provision 
that requires specific intent leaves little room to deem the ordinance sufficient and calls for 
reversal. As state so eloquently over a century ago and holding true today in (7/y of Los Angeles 
v. Colin, 35 P. 1002 (Calif. 1894), at 1004 "If we concede the existence of the principle of 
estoppel in pais against the public in certain exceptional cases, then this case is rightly decided, for 
this is an exceptional case. If this character of estoppel may be pleaded where justice and right 
require it, then it may be successfully pleaded in this case, for justice to these defendants demands 
it. There are limits beyond which even a city, in representing the rights of the public, may not go, 
and we think the city, in the present action, has gone beyond those limits." 
DATED this 2nd of February 1998 
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letter? 
A. The notice states the specific ordinances 
which they are in violation of, describes what will 
need to happen in order for compliance to be met, and 
I notified them on that that if they did not contact 
me within a specific time frame that the file would be 
forwarded to the city attorney's office for legal 
proceedings. 
Q. At that point what did you do next? 
A. That was mailed March nth. I did not 
receive a response, and on March 19, 1996 I went out 
to the site once again with another zoning officer, 
Roger Gonzalez, in order to take photos that would 
document the specific violation that I was preparing 
to send to your office --to the city attorney's 
office for legal proceedings. 
Q. And that was what date again? 
A. That was March 19th. March 20, 1996 I sent 
a letter to William and Joan Patton informing them 
that the file had been sent to the city attorney's 
office for legal action. 
I neglected -- I'm sorry, and can I add 
something? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I neglected to mention that 
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look at what's been marked as City's Exhibit No. 1. 
Do you recognize that photo? 
A. I do. 
Q. What is that a photo of? 
A. This is a photo of the house that according 
to the Utah County Recorder's Office is owned by 
William and Joan Patton. 
Q. When was that photo taken? 
A. It was taken on March 19, 19 96. 
Q. Who took that photo? 
A. Actually Roger Gonzalez took that photo. 
Q. Were you with him at the time that photo was 
taken? 
A. I was with him. 
Q. Does that photo accurately and fairly 
represent the state of the property on that date, 
March 19, 1996? 
A. It does. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, may I approach the 
witness again? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: I'm handing you what's been 
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. What is that? 
A. This is another photo of the property owned 
by William and Joan Patton, taken March 19, 1996. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. PATTON: 
Q. Mr. Malloy, what vehicles are in violation 
of the ordinance? 
A. Specifically on that date? On the subject 
lot that we're discussing today there is a trailer 
parked in the front yard area that is, in my opinion, 
was inoperable, and violates Section 14-34-080. 
Q. And that's the only vehicle that you find in 
violation? 
A. On this lot at this time, that is correct. 
THE COURT: When you say, "this time," whac 
time frame are you talking about? 
THE WITNESS: I believe we're addressing 
March 19th, is that right, or are we discussing today? 
THE COURT: No, that's correct. That should 
be the date you're speaking of. 
THE WITNESS: It was. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Is the vehicle wrecked? 
A. In my opinion it was inoperable and 
unlicensed. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
or an unlicensed vehicle (inaudible) city code? 
A. I'm not sure if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
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in the state code? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. Is there a definition of a wrecked vehicle 
in the policy and procedure of -- for your department? 
A. In Section 14-34-080 it does describe 
certain vehicles that would be considered a violation 
of that section of the ordinance. 
Q. (Inaudible). 
A. 14-34-080. 
Q. Did you check to see if there was an 
accident report filed on this vehicle? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Do you know if there's an accident report on 
file for this vehicle? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Was there a report from a garage or a body 
shop that this vehicle was in for repairs and did not 
have a accident damage sticker? 
A. I do not recall if I received any. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether the vehicle was wrecked? 
A. I do not believe so. If it's inoperable 
that is evident --it has flat tires that are on the 
vehicle for a period of one year or several months, 
then I would say it pretty well indicates that it's 
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inoperable. If it's unlicensed -- if it's licensed 
then there should be tags on the vehicle showing that: 
it is licensed. 
Q. Is there an occasion for one zoning officer 
when they find a vehicle wrecked (inaudible) another, 
both find the same vehicle to (inaudible) is there an 
occasion where one zoning officer may find a vehicle 
wrecked while another will not find the same vehicle 
to be wrecked? 
A. I can only account through how I would 
visually see it, but I can't answer for somebody else. 
Q. Is the vehicle junked? 
A. I would say it's inoperable. 
Q. Is there 
the city code? 
A. I do not 
Q. Is there 
the state code? 
1 A. I do not 
1 Q. Is there 
a definition of a junked vehicle 
knew if there is. 
a definition of a junked vehicle 
know if there is. 
a definition of a junked vehicle 
your department's policy and procedure? 
A. I do not know if there is other than what 
described in Section 14-34-080. 
Q. Does faded paint make a vehicle a junk 
vehicle? 
in 
in 
in 
is 
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I would say no. 
Does something have to be unusable to be 
A. Alone they may not be a violation. 
Q. Does a missing molding make a vehicle a 
3 j junked vehicle? 
4 | A. I guess it would depend upon hew extensive 
5 j what was missing. 
6 I Q. Does a dingy look make a vehicle a junk 
vehicle? 
A. 
Q* 
junked? 
A. According to this section of the ordinance 
when describing vehicles, it does nou just reference 
junked vehicles, it says inoperative, dismantled, 
partially dismantled, unlicensed, et cetera. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether the vehicle is junked? 
A. If I'm assessing whether or not it's 
inoperable or junked, then I would say, yes, it is 
subjective to an extent. But if it's inoperable then 
it would be obvious to me or other people I would 
imagine. But once again, I cannot answer how somebody 
else would see something. 
Q. Is there an occasion where one zoning office 
may find a vehicle junked while another will not find 
the same vehicle to be junked? 
A. I think I answered that, and I couldn't 
ansv/er how somebody else would see something. 
Q. Is the vehicle partially dismantled? 
A. Is the vehicle partially dismantled? 
Q. The trailer we're talking about. 
A. I cannot see what's in the back of the 
trailer. When we were just meeting on Friday I did 
point out, too, that the vehicle was -- well, last 
Monday that it wasn't -- did not have tags that I 
could see showing it was licensed, and it did net have 
tires that -- you know, that they could be used, it 
had flat tires. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in the city code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in the state code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of partially 
dismantled in your department's policy and procedure? 
A, I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Did you verify that this vehicle was 
dismantled in accordance with the state code? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you verify that there was a license to 
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dismantle, as required by state code? 
A. I did not. What I filed on (inaudible) was 
a violation of Section 14-34-080, which would include 
not only that the vehicle is dismantled, but also that 
it is inoperative, not licensed. Any one of those 
issues would be a violation of that section of the 
ordinance, and require the vehicle to either be moved 
off the lot or placed behind the fence or in a 
building, not in the front yard set back. 
Q. Did you inform public safety officers or the 
prosecutor attempting to dismantle a vehicle without 
proper license may be violated? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Can a vehicle be operable and partially 
dismantled? 
A. With this specific vehicle I would say that 
it would be hard to operate it with flat tires. 
Q. How many flat tires did you see? 
A. I believe I -- if I recall correctly there 
were two. 
Q. Did you verify whether the Pattons were 
operating this vehicle? 
A. Prior to March 19th or as of this date, no, 
I did not. 
Q. As of this date. 
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A. I did not. I had not received any personal 
contact with you at that point in time, nor had I 
tried to initiate physical contact because of the sign 
that is posted on your property that informs agents --
that informs local agencies and representatives to not 
enter your property. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer, such as yourself, as to whether the vehicle 
is partially dismantled? 
A. I would say that in part that may be the 
fact, but again, it would be quite objective as far as 
being able to see visually whether it is dismantled or 
not. 
Q. Is the vehicle inoperable? 
A. I would say, yes, it is. 
Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in the 
city code? 
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in the 
state code? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of inoperable in your 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Are you aware of whether or not Provo City 
has adopted certain state codes into the city code in 
their entirety? 
A. I'm not sure whether they have or not. 
Q. Are you familiar with this book? 
A. I am. 
MS. PATTON: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Would you please identify 
ard read the first marked passage on the following 
page, 942, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 
Adopted," please, right there. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, objection, 
relevancy. I'm not following the relevancy of this. 
THE COURT: You're asking him to read--
MS. PATTON: Just one paragraph, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And cite again what you're 
asking him to read. 
MS. PATTON: I'm asking him to read on page 
942-010, "Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 
Adopted." 
THE COURT: That is not 14-34-080? 
MS. PATTON: No, it is not. 
THE COURT: Would you address, please, the 
objection with respect to relevancy then? Ms. Patton, 
the objection on relevancy. 
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MS. PATTON: If you'll just give me a little 
leeway, your Honor, I can tie all this in. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll give you all the 
leeway that you need, but you'll comply with the rules 
just like Mr. Humiston has to comply with them. And 
we have an objection to the question on relevancy, and 
I'm asking you to demonstrate and tell me why it's 
relevant, and if it's not relevant he doesn't have to 
answer it. If it is relevant he does have to answer 
it. 
MS. PATTON: According to my perception, 
which may not always be good, your Honor, it's my 
understanding that Provo City adopted this ordinance 
into their code from the State. 
THE COURT: Read what she's asked you to 
read. 
THE WITNESS: The title for this section is 
"Police Ordinances, Provisions of the Motor Vehicle 
Act Adopted." Should I proceed to read the--
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Just only that which is 
marked. There's just one little -- right there, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Has he read what you've asked 
him to read? 
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to read it all? 
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THE COURT: The question--
MS. PATTON: Just what's underlined. 
THE WITNESS: Just what's underlined? 
THE COURT: The question to you is to read 
whatever she's asked you to read. I deny the 
objection. Go ahead and read what she's asked you to 
read. 
THE WITNESS: "The Motor Vehicle Act, 
Chapter 1 of Title 41, Utah Code as amended is hereby 
adopted as a Provo City Ordinance." 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Mr. Malloy, are you familiar 
with this book? 
A. Somewhat familiar. 
MR. HUMISTON: State for the record that 
she's identified the Utah Code, I believe Section 41. 
THE COURT: Well, she hasn't identified 
anything yet other than the book in her hand. 
MS. PATTON: I just want to know if he 
recognized the book. It is the Utah Code Annotated 
Volume II, for the record. 
May I approach again, please 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Mr. Malloy, would you please 
identify and read the first marked passage on the 
following page, 41-1A-1009. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, could I have a 
moment to get there myself? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. State it again, will 
you please, Ms. Patton? 
MS. PATTON: 41-1A-1009. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. Do you have it? 
THE WITNESS: I do. "Abandoned and 
inoperable vehicles, vessels and outboard motors 
determination by commission disposal of vehicles. l, 
a vehicle vessel or outboard motor is abandoned and 
inoperable when a) the vehicle, vessel or outboard 
motor has been inspected by an authorized investigator 
or agent appointed by the commission, and b) the 
authorized investigator or agent has made a written 
determination that the vehicle, vessel or outboard 
motor cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed in a manner 
that allows its use as designed by the manufacturer." 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Are you an authorized 
investigator or agent of the state tax commission? 
A. I am not. 
Q. Was the determination of inoperability made 
in accordance with that state code? 
A. This state code references specifically 
abandoned and inoperable vehicles. Section 14-34-080 
goes beyond only referencing abandoned and/or 
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inoperable vehicles. So you were cited for the 
violation of Section 14-34-080, which in my opinion, 
includes other areas than just being abandoned or 
inoperable. 
Q. So you're saying that the city code 
overrides the state code; is that what I'm hearing you 
say? 
A. What I'm saying is what I specifically cited 
you for the violation of. If you're asking for an 
interpretation of what the City's policy is, I cannot: 
answer that. 
Q. Does the City have a written policy for--
A. I'm not aware if there is or not. 
Q. Has there been a request for the 
determination of inoperability under that state code 
that you--
A. As far as I'm aware there has not been. 
Q. With no other definition of inoperable, has 
this vehicle been determined to be inoperable by 
you --by yourself? 
A. In my opinion, yes, it is inoperable. 
Q. Did you ever ask the Pattons if the vehicle 
was operable? 
A. As I've expressed to you, prior to this daue 
I was not in a position to speak with you, nor had I 
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received any response from ycu to the letters that I 
had sent to you in order to ask you in regards to that 
specific question. 
Q. Is the vehicle abandoned? 
A. I would say it's more than likely not 
abandoned. 
Q. So your answer is no? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is the vehicle licensed? 
A. I could not see anything that would 
reference it as being licensee. 
Q. Does the ordinance make a distinction 
between licensed and unlicensed vehicles, or are they 
dealt with in this same manner? 
A. They are not dealt with in this same manner. 
If the vehicle is unlicensed then according to this 
section of ordinance 14-34-080 on a residential lot a 
maximum of two vehicles may be maintained, but each 
vehicle must be either within a building or behind an 
opaque screening fence. If the vehicle is operable 
and licensed then the owner of the property is 
required to provide legal parking for that and all 
other operable vehicles that they own, or tenants own. 
Q. Is the term "opaquen defined in the Provo 
City code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether or not opaque is 
defined. 
Q. Is the term "opaque" defined in the state 
code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether or not opaque is 
defined in the state code. 
Q. Is the term "opaque" defined in the policy 
and procedure? 
A. Is the what, sorry? 
Q. Excuse me. Is the term "opaque" defined in 
the city policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Are opaque and sight obscuring the same 
thing? 
A. I would say that they are. 
Q. Does the Provo City code give a height 
requirement for an opaque screening fence? 
A. It does. 
Q. Does your department's policy and procedure 
give a height requirement for an opaque screening 
fence? 
A. It does. 
Q. Is non-sight obscuring defined as at least 
5 0 percent open? 
A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 
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Q. Yes, I surely could. Is non-sight obscuring 
defined as at least 50 percent open? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Is any fence less than 50 percent open 
considered to be sight obscuring? 
A. Is any fence less than 50 percent open 
considered sight obscuring? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Is there a fence between the vehicle and the 
public street? 
A. Between this specific vehicle? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There is -- well, there is a gate. 
Q. Is there a fence between the vehicle and the 
adjoining property? 
A. Is there a fence between this and the 
adjoining property? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I believe there is. 
Q. Is the fence sight obscuring? 
A. There are numerous fences that we need to 
address. If we're not going to address the other 
property, then how can I possibly describe the fences 
that would separate the properties? 
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Q. I am referring simply to that (inaudible). 
A. The fence that is along the front property 
line specifically in front of the vehicle, I believe, 
was intended to be sight obscuring. It's used as a 
gate, but over the years the fence has continued to 
dilapidate, and now as the photos depict, you can see 
that many of the slats in the chain link fence have 
either been moved or are in bad shape so that the 
fence itself more than likely would be -- the gate 
area more than likely would be 50 percent open. 
Q. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
position? I don't think this -- oh, maybe it will. 
Here we go. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
position when the zoning officers approved compliance 
during defendant's 1994 probation for zoning 
violations? 
A. I did not work for Provo City at that time, 
so I'm not aware. 
Q. Was the vehicle in substantially the same 
condition as -- well, I'll ask this later. Would the 
City have had any (inaudible) authority and right 
under the probation to bring the property into 
compliance at defendants' expense had she not brought 
it into compliance? 
A. I'm sorry, I didn't follow the beginning 
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1 part of what you said. 
2 Q. Would the City have any enforced its 
3 authority and right under the probation to bring the 
4 property into compliance at defendants' expense had 
5 she not brought it into compliance? 
6 A. What probation? 
7 i Q. Any probation. As an example, this type, if 
8 nothing was brought into compliance, then would the 
9 City enforce its right to say, "Take the trailer, take 
10 the fence down?" 
11 A. I believe that that is what we have 
12 requested of you to either move the vehicle to another 
13 place on the lot or remove it from the lot to comply 
14 with Section 14-34-080. 
15 Q. But the vehicle had been removed under 
16 (inaudible) defendants' last guilty verdict by the 
17 I City if trie vehicle was not in compliance at that 
18 time? 
IS J THE COURT: Ms. Patton, I don't have an 
20 objection, but I'm going to sustain it anyway. 
21 I My objection is that we are not here to 
22 discuss matters of prior hearings and any rulings with 
23 respect to whether there was a guilty or not guilty 
24 verdict, as you've characterized it. Please don't get 
25 into those. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Has the standard for 
determining a vehicle's compliance changed between 
1994 and present? 
A. I did not work for Provo City in 1994, so I 
couldn't answer for that. in my opinion since I 
started with Provo City in November of 1995 it has not 
changed. 
Q. This is a 1996 (inaudible). 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So my question is, in 1994 has the 
compliance changed? Are you aware if the compliance 
has changed? 
A. I would need to reference the 1994 ordinance 
and compare them to today's ordinance to knov/ whether 
they have changed. 
Q. Is the property presently in violation of 
sub section 3 of the Provo City Ordinance in Count I? 
A. Could you show me a copy of that ordinance 
that we're referencing at this point? 
THE COURT: It's 14-34-080 Section 3? Is 
that what you're talking about? 
MS. PATTON: Uh-huh. 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible) . 
THE WITNESS: You said sub section 3? 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Yes. 
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A. Should I read that? 
Q. You're welcome to. 
A. "No trash, used materials, junk, household 
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or 
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The 
accumulation of more than one such item constitutes a 
junk yard as defined in Chapter 14-06, Provo City 
Code, and must be removed from the property, stored 
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in 
an M-2 zone." 
Because I have not been on the subject lot, 
I do not know what is in the backyard area. There is 
a sign, as I've described before, that prohibits me 
from going on the site to determine what is in the 
backyard. Because I have not been on the site nor 
seen what's in the backyard I cannot answer that 
adequately in response to your question. 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. I'm sorry, what's that? 
Q. Does the yard have trash on it? 
A. As I just said, I cannot determine what's in 
the backyard area because I have not been--
Q. On what you have seen. 
A. In the front yard area I have not seen it as 
today's date. On March 19, 1996, however, there was 
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other materials that I referenced by sub section 3. 
There were materials in the yard area. 
Q. Does the yard have used materials in it? 
A. When? 
THE COURT: We're talking about 3/19/96? 
MS. PATTON: Uh-huh, that's correct. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, there were at that point 
in time materials in the front yard area. Again, I do 
not know what was in the backyard area. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: Is the term "used materialff 
defined in the Provo City Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
state code? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "used material" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm net sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Does the term relate to items used in 
building structures? 
A. Does the term or does the ordinance? 
Q. Does the term (inaudible) the word material? 
A. it may well refer to materials used for 
construction. 
Q. Does the term relate to previously utilized 
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fabric? 
A. It may well reference that. 
Q. The ordinance has a term "used material" in 
a plural form in the ordinance violated if a singular 
used material is present. 
A. I'm sorry, I don't follow what you're 
saying. 
Q. It says, "used materials." Was there used 
materials upon that date? 
A. I would say, yes, there were. 
Q. Is it possible that the used materials that 
you alleged observed were in fact a trailer loaded 
with junk to be taken to a landfill? 
A. In the front yard area? 
Q. You have two pictures, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I do. 
Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2? 
Uh-huh, that is correct. 
There are some trailers that you've given 
testimony to? 
A. 
Q. 
That is correct. 
Okay, my question then of those trailers, is 
it possible that the used materials that you allegedly-
observed 
taken to 
were in fact a trailer loaded with junk to be 
a landfill? 
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A. That material was present and you are 
correct, but there were other items in the yard area 
in addition to the materials in the trailers. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether things are used materials? 
A. In some ways I guess that it could be. 
Q. Does the yard have junk on it? 
A. It did. 
Q. is the term "junk" defined in the Provo Cicy 
Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "junk" defined in the Utah State 
Code? 
A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
Q. Is the term "junk" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
Q. Is it possible that the junk you observed 
was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the landfill 
at its earliest opportunity? 
A. Some materials were, as I said just a minute 
ago, but there were definitely other materials in the 
yard area that were not loaded into a trailer, and 
were not going to be moved at the earliest convenience 
co a site other than the residence. 
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I have no idea what your intentions were for 
the materials since you did not contact me in response 
to my letters, but we're talking about several months. 
I would imagine in that time you would have had an 
opportunity, if it was at your earliest convenience, 
to move those in a two month period. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether things are junk? 
A. In some ways it may be. 
Q. Does the property have household furniture 
on it? 
A. I do not recall specifically whether there 
are household -- was household furniture on the lot. 
Q. Is lawn furniture considered to be household 
furniture? 
A. Lawn furniture, in my opinion, would not be 
characteristic of the same furniture you would use in 
your home. 
Q. Is outdoor furniture considered to be 
household furniture? 
A. No, it does not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
in the Provo City Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
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in the Utah State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. Is there a definition of household furniture 
in the department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether there is or not. 
Q. And is it a subjective judgment by the 
zoning officer as to whether things are household 
furniture? 
A. Other than common sense of what is household 
furniture, then I would say that it is a subjective 
issue. 
Q. Does the property have appliances on it? 
A. On the lot or you mean in the yard area? 
Q. In the yard area. 
A. I have no idea what's in the backyard area, 
I have noc seen it. I do not recall specifically what 
was in the front yard area other than recalling that 
there were definitely items in violation of that 
section, Section 14-34-080 in the yard area, March 19, 
1996. Unfortunately I did not keep a leg of specific 
items in the yard area on that date. 
Q. Is it a yes or no answer to whether there's 
appliances on the property as far as what you could 
see? 
A. As far as what I could see I don't recall. 
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1 Q. Does the yard have scrap material on it? 
2 A. I would say yes, it did. 
3 Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
4 Provo City Code? 
5 A. I'm not aware of whether it is or not. 
6 Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
7 Utah State Code? 
8 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
9 Q. Is the term "scrap material" defined in the 
10 department's policy and procedure? 
11 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
12 Q. is it possible that your alleged scrap 
13 material was loaded on a trailer for disposal at the 
14 landfill at its earliest opportunity? 
15 A. I guess it is possible that some of the 
16 items on those trailers were scrap material, but there 
17 is still definicely other materials on the subject lot 
18 at that time. 
19 Q. Is it possible that your alleged scrap 
20 J material was new material that hadn't been used yet? 
21 A. Some of it may have been that, but in my 
22 opinion, there were other items on the lot that were 
23 scrap material. 
24 Q. Is it uhe subjective judgment by the zoning 
25 J officer as to whether things are scrap material? 
1 A. In some ways, yes, it is. 
2 Q. Does the yard have equipment or parts 
3 thereof on it? 
4 J A. Equipment or parts generally? From what I 
5 could see in the front yard area I would say yes, 
6 under that general term. Again, in the backyard I 
7 have no idea whether or not there was those materials, 
8 even though the ordinance does reference any open 
9 area. Because of physical limitations I could not see 
10 what was in the backyard. 
11 Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Provo 
12 City Code? 
13 Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in Utah 
14 State Code? 
15 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
16 Q. Is the term "equipment" defined in the 
17 department's policy and procedure? 
18 A. I'm not sure whether it is or not. 
19 j Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
20 officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
21 A. Whether what? 
22 Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
23 officer as to whether objects are equipment? 
24 I A. Again, other than common sense of being able 
25 to identify whether an object is equipment or not, it 
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is a subject interpretation. 
Q. Is there open areas within the boundaries of 
this property? 
A. There is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in Provo 
City Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not it is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in Utah 
State Code? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not it is. 
Q. Is the term "open areas" defined in the 
department's policy and procedure? 
A. I'm not sure whether or not it is. 
Q. Is the property exposed with an opaque or 
sight obscuring fence? 
A. Not to the extent that it would screen the 
materials from the public right-of-ways or adjacent 
lots. 
Q. Is the sight obscuring fence at least 
(inaudible) inches in height? 
A. I have not measured specifically how high 
the fence is. 
Q. If the area in question is behind the 
screening fence, is the area an open area in this lot? 
A. I guess anything is possible if we're 
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speaking about what-if's. In this specific situation 
it is not enclosed, it is an open area in the front 
yard. 
Q. Is it a subjective judgment by the zoning 
officer as to whether an area within a fence --
private yard is an open area? 
A. This ordinance says that the junk needs to 
be inside of a building, so anything that's not inside 
of a building would be an open area. 
Q. Has the defendant ever been charged with 
violations of Provo City Ordinances before now? 
MR. MCGINN: Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: When you first started 
working for the zoning department approximately 17 
months ago, were you handed an open file on Joan 
Paccon? 
A. I do not recall whether it was open or not. 
I was given the file, though. 
Q. Of which you have been in (inaudible) up 
through this 17 months? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you have any idea how old the fence is in 
question? 
A. The fence on the subject lot? 
SI 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. According to the information you gave me, it 
was in 1962 that it was put in, or there abouts. 
Q. Is the fence in question acting as an opaque 
or sight obscuring structure required by another Provo 
City Ordinance? 
A. The fence that is along the front property 
line of the property that you own with the residents 
on it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It would not serve the purpose of being 
opaque or screening to the extent the ordinance would 
require to screen an inoperable vehicle. 
Q. Have the Pattons' neighbors complained about 
the fence? 
A. I have not spoken to any of the neighbors 
regarding your property. 
Q. Does the fence pose a risk to health safety 
and welfare? 
A. This same fence that we're speaking about? 
Q. (Inaudible) utilizing the public streets and 
walks? 
A. In my opinion probably not. 
Q. Are certain neighbors in the city held to a 
higher zoning enforcement standards than others? 
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A. As zoning changes there are non-conforming 
rights that different property owners may have. In 
that situation, yes, some are held to a different 
standard than others. 
Q. Are there differences in policy and 
procedure from neighborhood to neighborhood 
(inaudible)? 
A. From zone to zone there are specific 
requirements. 
Q. Is this the only property charged with a 
violation in this neighborhood? 
A. With a violation in general or a specific 
violation? 
Q. I'm the only one that's on my street that's 
been charged with property violations? 
A. Period with any violation, that's what I'm 
asking, or specifically with this--
Q. For a zoning (inaudible). 
A. No, you are not. 
Q. How many are there on the street? Do you 
know? 
A. I would need to check my records to see 
historically what we have worked with since I have 
worked in the city. 
Q. Did (inaudible) of this property arise after 
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a citizen complaint? 
A. I had received and have received several 
calls from concerned residents in regards to your 
property. 
Q. And who would those residents be? 
A. I don't have that information in front of 
me. 
Q. But you do have it on file? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Was a charge levied against this property 
because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at 
the time prior to the charge? 
A. I cannot really answer that. When I started 
with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to 
investigate those, and one such case was your 
property. Because there had been previous work on it 
I did browse through the existing file, but did not 
use the material in there. I went out to the site and 
saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action 
as of that date in contacting you and requesting that 
the property be brought into compliance. 
MS. PATTON: I have no more questions for 
the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like 
to reserve the right to inquire the witness further. 
THE COURT: You may. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGINN: 
Q. Officer Malloy, forget about the trailer, 
forget about the trailer right now on this piece of 
property that we're talking about. Forget it's not 
there. On that day we're there, on March 19, 1996, 
was there scrap material, junk, garbage, trash in the 
front yard area constituting a violation? 
A. There were. 
Q. Is it possible that two different zoning 
officers could ever at one time go out to a piece of 
property and one officer miss a violation? 
A. I would say that would be unlikely, but it 
could happen. 
MR. MCGINN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May I see the exhibits, please? Do you have 
them right there? Thank you. 
Call your next witness, will you, please? 
MR. MCGINN: Mr. Roger Gonzalez. 
THE COURT: Before Mr. Gonzalez testifies, 
Mr. Schriner and Mr. Means? 
Ms. Patton, is there a problem? 
MS. PATTON: Yes, I object, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Object to what? 
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MS. PATT0N: I asked him discovery who the 
witnesses would be, and Mr. Malloy said that they had 
no witnesses, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let me address--
MS. PATTON: Mr. McGinn, pardon me. 
THE COURT: Let me address that in a minute. 
Why don't you have a seat. 
Before we call the next witness, the case 
that was on before you folks has been resolved for 
some time. I want to dispose of it now so that these 
folks can go on their way. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: Thank you, folks, for the 
interruption. 
Now Mr. McGinn, you were calling another 
witness? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor, Roger 
Gonzalez, and I believe they were objecting. 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, you had an 
objection. State your objection, will you, please? 
MS. PATTON: I did not receive any discovery 
that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a witness, therefore 
I have not had a chance to prepare. 
THE COURT: I didn't see any scheduling 
order that said identification of witnesses. 
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Mr. McGinn? 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, if I could respond 
to that. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCGINN: Joan Patton has come into 
office several times. Our office has an open file 
policy. I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has 
come in and asked for discovery. In our office if --
and to show them, in our file -- if they come in we'll 
allow them to look at the file, or we just make copies 
of everything that's in the file. We give everybody 
everything, there should be no secrets, that's our 
office policy and that's what we do. 
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in 
several times, we do have a cover sheet. It has a 
list of our officers that says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger 
Gonzalez from the zoning department." Anytime they 
come in and take a look that's there, and those are 
the orders that we give for them for people who--
THE COURT: When did the defendants first 
become aware of the name of Roger Gonzalez associated 
in this charge? 
MS. PATTON: Just now, your Honor. 
MR. HUMISTON: Your Honor, every document in 
this file was provided to me in discovery except the 
one that Mr. McGinn is referring to. This is the 
first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez. 
I appreciate they do have an open file 
policy and (inaudible) very generous, but this issue 
has come up and we also find out for the first time 
that there were neighbor complaints, which issue was 
specifically addressed at the time of pre-trial. So 
I'm getting the impression that the open file policy 
has been less than entirely open. 
MR. MCGINN: They've had access to 
everything I have and more. Joan's called me and 
asked me for -- or Ms. Patton has called me and asked 
me for files that community development's had that 
I've not had in my possession, given those files to 
her; she's been free to go through it. 
THE COURT: Well, there's nothing contained 
in the files with respect to identification of 
witnesses on either side -- objection to witnesses 
identification or objection to exhibits. That means 
everything's been done informally. 
MS. PATTON: Can I be heard, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. PATTON: The motion for the bill of 
particulars, which we've had a hearing on, I did 
specifically at that time ask for a witness list and 
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have not to this date been given a witness list, your 
Honor, and I do not dispute what Mr. Malloy has 
said -- or Mr. McGinn, I'm sorry. 
I did in fact see everything that was in 
that file except for the top page that I have just nov/ 
seen. 
MR. MCGINN: If I may approach just to show 
the Court--
THE COURT: Just a moment. Would you poinz 
out for me, please, where in your bill of particulars 
you ask for identification of witnesses? 
MS. PATTON: I did it verbally, your Honor, 
before Judge Howard, in which I don't have a 
transcript. 
THE COURT: I have your bill of particulars 
and I have your memorandum in support of your bill cE 
particulars, and there is nothing by way of any 
request for witnesses. I'm going to deny your 
objection. 
Mr. Gonzalez? 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
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ROGER GONZALEZ 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCGINN: 
Q. Sir, would you please state your name for 
the record? 
A. Roger Gonzalez. 
Q. For whom do you work? 
A. I work for Provo City, code enforcement 
officer. 
Q. And how long have you done that? 
A. I have done that particular job for 
approximately 16 months. 
Q. Officer, I want to direct your attention to 
March 19, 19S6. Did you accompany Anthony Malloy to 
1067 North 750 West on that day? 
A. I did. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. I was asked to go with him just to witness 
the violation, which he basically had been addressing. 
Q. And when you arrived at that address what 
did you do? 
A. I proceeded to take the camera and take some 
photographs of the purported violations. 
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Q. Officer, do you recognize these photos that 
have been entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 and 2? 
A. I do. 
Q. Did you take those? 
A. I did. 
Q. Does Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2 show in any 
detail the interior area of the Patton property? 
A. It does not, it shows only the trailer, 
which is in the driveway area. 
Q. Would you describe for the Court what types 
of materials you saw in the front yard area at this 
address on that date? 
A. I saw some debris of wood and lumber scraps 
that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the 
yard. I also saw some boxes --it looked like it 
contains either canned food or fruits and vegetables, 
that type of thing. I saw some cardboard paper, I saw 
some other materials that were enclosed in plastic 
bags. 
THE COURT: Were those items on the street 
side of the fence or the house side of the fence? 
THE WITNESS: They were on the house side of 
the fence. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: Were there additional items 
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Q. Is this on the sidewalk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Adjacent to the property? 
A. Adjacent to the property in front of the 
property. 
Q. And how far away were you from the actual 
materials that you've just described? 
A. I was probably five, ten feet, not very far. 
Q. Were you able to see it clearly from the 
sidewalk? 
A. I was. 
MR. MCGINN: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Patton, do you have any 
questions for him? 
MS. PATTON: In the interest of time, your 
Honor, because I was not aware and did not prepare for 
this, I'm going to ask Mr. Humiston to question 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, he's not going to question 
for both of you. 
MR. HUMISTON: I'm going to question him on 
behalf of Mr. Patton, but I guess she doesn't have any 
questions prepared because we did not know about this 
witness. 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
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see it? 
MR. HUMISTON: 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 
THE COURT: Mr 
you, sir? 
i MR. HUMISTON: 
• Honor. 
THE COURT: IS 
Yes. 
1 received 
. Humiston, 
No further 
Mr. Patton 
into evidence) 
anything else from | 
evidence, your 
going co testify? 
MR. HUMISTON: He is not. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Does the City want to be heard? 
MR. MCGINN: Closing arguments, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir, closing arguments, 
we're now in that posture. 
MR. MCGINN: Thank you. Your Honor, there-
has been much made of discrimination, singling out the 
Pattons. There's no evidence of that. Anthony Mailoy 
testified that there are several violations in that 
area that they are working on, he didn't have his 
notes to tell them how many other violations are in 
the neighborhood. Nobody's targeting the Pattons. 
Officer Mailoy, Officer Gonzales went out to 
the property, saw on March 19, 1996 that there was 
garbage, junk, materials in the -- may I approach, 
your Honor, they are right there. 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCGINN: They testified that from that 
photo you can't see clearly the interior of the yard, 
but Mr, Gonzalez was clear in that he stood on the 
sidewalk, looked in the yard, and described the types 
of materials; lumber that was in various bits and 
pieces, food upon the ground that were not covered, 
there was some questions alluding to the fact that 
this could have been firewood, but it was not kept --
there is no evidence that it was kept in any sort of 
manner, there is no evidence that it was used as 
firewood. There was boxes, bags strewn across the 
front yard. 
They are clearly in violation. When there's 
a violation that needs to be addressed. If the 
property gets cleaned up and in five months there's 
another violation, that violation needs to be 
addressed. 
We think the evidence that has been 
presented to the Court is clear. There's only been 
three witnesses, both Officers Malloy and Gonzalez 
testified that the yard in question did have junk, 
garbage, material, trash. 
Mr. Keller for the defense testified --he 
testified that the whole neighborhood --he testified 
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this was something he had only found out last week. 
So I would submit that as far as the count 
that remains, the State has failed to establish a 
prima facia case of a violation, and we would rest on 
that. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
MR. MCGINN: Thank you, your Honor. 
Subjective to termination, your Honor, terms and 
ordinances have their plain and ordinary meaning, and 
I understand that some people may consider one man's 
garbage is another man's treasure. But in this case 
the evidence was clear there were wood strewn about 
the lawn with -- uncovered that had been weathered, 
there were paper or cartons -- cardboard cartons thai: 
were overflowing, splitting, had been left out in the 
weather, were in a weathered condition. 
I think this clearly under the plain and 
ordinary words used in the ordinance, 14-34-080, are 
trash, junk, materials that are clearly in the area. 
As far as any intent, the officer indicated 
that he sent a letter indicating that there was a 
violation, the letter came back from Ms. Patton 
indicating that she didn't think there was a 
violation. 
As to the meaning of the vehicle, whether 
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this trailer is junk, operational, the statute that 
was cited and read by Anthony Malloy --by Joan Patton 
and read by Anthony Malloy, 41-1A-1008, deals with 
salvaged titles and selling inoperable vehicles for 
scrap. It has nothing to do with whether a vehicle is 
inoperable or abandoned in dealing with zoning, 
because it's salvaged titles. 
And whether the Court considers the 
vehicle -- the trailer, I think that's really 
irrelevant, because not looking at the trailer, 
there's certainly sufficient testimony offered by two 
witnesses that is unrebutted by anybody that there was 
junk and materials that would fit the plain and 
ordinary meaning of 14-34-080. 
Submit it on that to the Court. 
THE COURT: Thank you. From the testimony 
provided, and from the exhibits that have been 
received, I have difficulty in being able to determine 
that the first part of Count I of an unlicensed motor 
vehicle, a wrecked, junked or partially dismantled or 
inoperative or abandoned motor vehicle was present on 
the defendant's property. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 are really of 
not much assistance to me to make any determination as 
to whether the yard is in compliance or it's not. 
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All those photographs really show is a 
residence with a bunch of material out in front and a 
parked trailer. 
Mr. Malloy testified that he didn't remember 
if the trailer had flat tires on it on March 19th or 
not, and he said he had no evidence of whether the 
trailer was registered or whether it wasn't. 
The second portion of the City's charging 
offense contained in Count I is the defendant, also 
during the time in question, stored trash, used 
materials, junk, household furniture, appliances, 
scrap materials, equipment or parts thereof in an open 
area not screened from the public streets and adjacent 
properties by an opaque wall or fence. 
In reading the statute and hearing the 
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and Mr. 
Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and the 
testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather 
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants' 
property complied in making it appear to be the same 
as the neighborhood in question, I find that the City 
has met its burden of proof concerning the second 
portion of that charging information in Count I, 
therefore I find the defendants guilty as charged. 
From the plain and simple meaning of the 
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ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, folks, I 
believe that the evidence has sufficiently 
demonstrated that there are items which consist of 
junk, stored trash, scraps of wood, deteriorated 
cardboard boxes, and even potential food products that 
looked like they had gone bad, from the witness' 
testimony. 
And with that testimony being the only 
testimony on the record, with nothing else to rebut it 
or to describe what it was, then the Court has only 
one conclusion to draw, and that is is it believable 
or is it not, and I find that the City has met its 
proof with respect to belief. 
The questions that came from the defendant, 
Mrs. Patton, was it possible for these things to be 
something else. I guess it's possible that Haley Bob 
comet had a spaceship behind it. Probable? Probably 
not. It's possible that all of these things were 
meant for the burning of firewood? Possible. But 
from the testimony I have on the record, and I have to 
make a finding from the testimony, it's probable that 
it was not firewood. So I find the defendants guilty 
as charged in Count I. 
What's your pleasure with respect to 
sentencing? You may be sentenced today on each of 
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Now Mr. Humiston, you had something to say? 
MR. HUMISTON: Well, your Honor, you 
addressed my objection in advance. I certainly 
strenuously object to any reference to the other lot 
in relation to sentencing on this lot. Certainly, as 
far as it's relevant, if the State is anticipating 
another prosecution, we're back to square 1, we will 
bring all the objections based on constitutionality 
and various other motions. 
But I certainly -- I agree with the Court, I 
think you addressed our objection already that any 
sentencing with this lot has to pertain strictly with 
this lot. 
THE COURT: I have no problem if Mr. Malloy 
and the Pattons with you, sir, want to meet and 
discuss what, if anything, needs to be done to bring 
1067 North 750 West into compliance, and then make 
recommendations at the time of sentencing concerning 
that issue. I'd be happy to hear those from both 
sides, but that's where we're going to restrict 
ourselves. 
MR. HUMISTON: If I respond, your Honor, 
just to review what we've done here today, Count II 
was dismissed and Count I, the finding was based on 
trash that was illegally in the yard on March 19th. 
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1 THE COURT: I found a violation of Count I. 
2 MR. HUMISTON: Right. 
3 THE COURT: The violation is based upon the 
4 trash that was found in the front yard, as you've 
5 phrased it. 
6 MR. HUMISTON: And so I understand that 
7 when we, at the first sentencing, sentencing will 
8 pertain to the issues as found in Court's finding, 
9 specifically trash in the yard; is that correct? 
10 THE COURT: My sentence will pertain to the 
11 fact that the property is out of compliance with the 
12 zoning because of the material that has been testified 
13 to as being in the yard. 
14 MR. HUMISTON: Okay, thank you. 
15 THE COURT: There is nothing in the street 
16 that I have found at this time that is out of 
17 compliance with the ordinance. 
18 MR. HUMISTON: I think we can go ahead and 
19 schedule the sentencing. 
20 COURT CLERK: We can set it on June llth at 
21 9 o'clock. 
22 THE COURT: Is June llth at 9 a.m. 
3 acceptable to you, Mrs. Patton? 
24 MS. PATTON: Your Honor, can we extend it 
25 just about another week? I have a woman whose baby is 
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MS. PATTON: I did, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to comment with 
regard to this request? 
MS. PATTON: I would, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. PATTON: As the Court pointed out, the 
entire discovery process has been handled very 
informally. In the memorandum that Mr. Malloy sent to 
Mr. McGinn, he states that he took the pictures that 
were entered in as evidence. This is the same 
memorandum that mentions that Roger Gonzalez was 
another zoning officer. 
Mr. Romney was the attorney from Provo City 
at my arraignment. He states on the court record that 
I will be given "everything that we have" from my 
verbal discovery request to the Court at the time from 
this statement. I conclude that the terms "everything 
in evidence, witness lists, complaints, et cetera." 
At the pre-trial conference Mr. Malloy was 
present, Mr. McGinn was present, I was there, Natalie 
Zabriskie, Michael Humiston was also present. Mr. 
Gonzalez was not present. At this conference I was 
asked -- I asked who the comolainants were, who the 
witnesses were, and Mr. Malloy informed me that there 
were no complainants, that he was the only one, that 
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this case originated because of an open file that he 
had been given when he first started working for Provo 
City. 
Let me emphasize that Mr. Gonzalez was not 
present, nor was his name even mentioned. Mr. Malloy 
further lead me to believe that the pictures that were 
in the file were taken by him. 
On three separate occasions I scheduled 
appointments with Mr. Malloy to come out to the 
property and tell me what the problems were. Each 
time Mr. Malloy arrived he came with another person, 
an intern named Bryce. 
At none of these meetings was Mr. Gonzalez 
mentioned. He was not present, and I was further lead 
to believe that Mr. Malloy had taken all the pictures 
and was the only zoning officer involved in this case. 
Accordingly I prepared my defense based on 
the City only using the items they had showed me as 
evidence, as Mr. Malloy as the sole witness. From the 
record of the trial is this evident that I had that 
had che trial proceeded I was lead to believe that it 
would, the outcome would have been completely 
different. 
It is obvious that the only testimony that 
allowed for the conviction was the testimony of Mr. 
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Gonzalez, and like Mr. Malloy, who had I prepared 
cross exam questions for, I had absolutely no time or 
opportunity to prepare any type of cross exam of Mr. 
Gonzalez. 
Had I known about the admission of Mr. 
Gonzalez, the admission of the additional surprise 
witness, I could have prepared for this eventuality. 
By the Court allowing testimony from this surprise 
witness, my case was unduly prejudiced, I was denied 
due process, I was not given the opportunity to face 
and cross question my accusers as guaranteed by this 
judicial system. The principle of fundamental 
fairness was compromised, and I did not get a fair 
trial. 
I personally did not feel that this one 
admission was done deliberately or maliciously, nor do 
I believe that the oversight was intention on the part 
of the Provo City prosecutor. However, in the 
interest of fundamental fairness, due process, and 
opportunity to defend against accusers, I would ask 
that this Court grant this motion for the arrest of 
judgment at this time. 
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard, 
Counsel? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor. I believe 
